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Ideology and paradox in British Civil Service accounts of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ in 
1857-59 
Alex Padamsee 
(University of Kent) 
 
Introduction 
At the conclusion to his essay on representing British authority in Victorian India, 
Bernard Cohn notes a minor but charged symbolic incident following the successful re-
taking of Delhi in late 1857.  This was an unofficial ceremony that took place in the 
palace of the deposed Mughal emperor in which English officers solemnly ate pork and 
drank wine.  Cohn refers to this tableau as the ‘desacralisation’ of the Mughal palace, and 
therefore Mughal rule, as the locus of a religiously neutral pan-Indian authority.1  
Connected here with the widespread British perception of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ as the 
guiding hand of the rebellion, the illegitimation of the Mughal figurehead through the 
taint of religious particularism becomes a means of proclaiming the resumption of a 
determinedly secular British dispensation.  This unofficial ceremony, clothed as it is in 
the garb of sectarianism, opens up a confusing aspect to the simultaneous official 
diffusion of Victoria’s declaration of religious tolerance throughout the major towns of 
North India at this time.  It suggests not only that the question of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ 
had quickly become central to strategies of British self-presentation in India in 1857, but 
also that this was a form of ideological subjectivity strongly marked by the workings of 
paradox. 
Despite the findings of an urgent report undertaken by the office of the Viceroy in 
1859 that found the charge of ‘conspiracy’ to be without sufficient evidential basis, the 
debate about the extent of co-ordinated Muslim activity during the ‘Mutiny’ has 
continued to form a staple of historiographical enquiry.  The consensus reached broadly 
follows Canning’s Private Secretary, L. B. Bowring, in his insistence that the perception 
was out of all proportion to the facts on the ground.2  Two connected paradigms largely 
inform current historiographical analysis of the phenomenon of the British perception.  
The first is that British officialdom in India was naturally ‘mussulmanophobic’ (a phrase 
coined by one official to explain this mindset in 1857).3  The second is that the failure of 
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British informational systems, and the desire for a more comprehensive explanation to 
resolve the confusion of events, led to a predictable accession to this 
‘mussulmanophobia’.4  This paper will argue that these paradigms, whilst being more or 
less relevant in themselves, fail to fully account for the genesis and peculiar features of 
Muslim ‘conspiracy’ in the official accounts.  This is because the historiographical focus 
that produces them has tended to be largely on the figure of the Muslim himself, both in 
literal terms of rebellious activity (were ‘his’ actions open to this kind of misperception), 
and in terms of the irreducible repetition of ‘mussulmanophobic’ features in the reports.  
Thus, for instance, historians commonly extract the language of Muslim 
‘bloodthirstiness’ in the correspondence of the young Civil Service recruit Alfred Lyall 
and cite it as self-explanatory of a pathological prejudice – but without looking to see the 
wider context of the archive of letters as a whole, or even the surrounding scaffolding of 
representation being constructed in a single letter.5  Ironically, the ascription of prejudice 
has held back any further enquiry. 
This paper makes a more detailed analysis of the accounts of Civil Service 
officials in the districts around the Delhi throne, from whom the cry of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’ first arose and by whom it was most tenaciously held.6  It shifts the focus of 
attention away from the Muslim ‘fanatic’, initially to the rest of ‘native’ society deployed 
around him in these narratives, and then in more detail to the self-representation of the 
Christian Civil Service officer (Civilian) describing him.  Rather than a handy accession 
to transhistorical prejudice, this kind of analysis reveals the extent to which the writing of 
Muslim ‘conspiracy’ responds to, as much as it produces, what is clearly a crisis in the 
official ideological identity of the writers.  Recent cultural theorists have pointed to the 
role of irrationality as a structuring element in all state ideologies, the features of which, 
they argue, invariably at some point appear to irrupt from without to threaten their own 
destruction.  The Civilian accounts give evidence of some of these forms of reciprocity 
running between the perception of the Muslim ‘fanatic’ and the instability of their own 
self-identification.  This kind of rubric offers a way beyond the impasse of 
‘mussulmanophobia’ and brings into question in unexpectedly complex ways the 
imbrication of secular neutrality and sectarianism in the official mindset, ways that 
suggest the ceremony in the Red Fort was illustrative of a structural paradox in the 
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maintenance of the ruling ideology of the Raj.  
 What is of concern here throughout are the wider narrative strategies in which the 
scene of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ is produced.  To get a sense of the broader context of its 
perception in 1857, then, it is necessary to begin with a brief reassessment of the place of 
anti-Muslim sentiment in the previous half-century of British Indian administration. 
 
‘Mussulmanophobia’ and colonialist praxis before 1857 
In his groundbreaking study of separatism among Indian Muslims in the United 
Provinces in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Francis Robinson insists 
that since the earliest days of colonial rule there existed a perception among British 
officials of Indian Muslim hostility towards the British Indian state.  He states that this 
was ‘the most important source of British awareness of the Muslims:  the threat they 
presented to the British Raj’.7  Under this rubric, the perception of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ 
in 1857 becomes self-explanatory, as an instinctive reaction to imaginatively incorporate 
and globalise any rebellious Indo-Muslim activity.  Peter Hardy, on the other hand, has 
offered an opposing explanation in The Muslims of British India.  He suggests that in 
1857 Muslims became incorporated in British eyes as a pan-Indian constituency for the 
first time.  He sees the events of 1857 as precipitating a British perception of disaffection, 
rather than, as Robinson argues, confirming it.8  But there is an underlying rationale 
shared between the two accounts.  Hardy’s evidence for this perception is, in effect, 
largely a catalogue of uncoordinated rebellious acts performed by Muslims at the time, 
and from which the suggestion of ‘conspiracy’ might therefore naturally arise.9  In other 
words, he implicitly relies upon a latent British assumption that acts performed by 
Muslims were acts performed as Muslims – and that the natural British inference would 
be that a pan-Indian Muslim insurrection was at hand. 
Against this shared supposition about the Anglo-Indian official’s vulnerability in 
1857 to the spectre of a globalised Muslim revolt, it is instructive to note that, across its 
institutions, colonialist praxis in the first half of the nineteenth century is notable for its 
prejudice in favour of Muslims over other religious communities and for its 
comparatively pragmatic responses to the threat of Muslim incorporative activity.  
Robinson’s own study makes the case in terms of the disproportionate patronage 
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extended to Muslims employed by the British in subordinate, judicial and executive 
postings in the North-West Provinces and Awadh.10  And Michael Fisher has 
demonstrated that the Muslim elite played the most prominent role in the Residency 
system, most importantly in the key post of Mir Munshi.11  Nor does the structure of the 
army in India reflect any disproportionate anxieties about the loyalty of its Muslim 
sepoys.  Although after the Vellore Mutiny in 1806 the question of the hand of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’ was raised and investigated, it was played down at the time, rather than 
encouraged, by British officials on the ground.12  Significantly, as with the Java ‘Mutiny’ 
ten years later, there were no urgent moves made to reorganise the structure of the army.  
This can be contrasted with the wholesale reorganisation in army practice introduced 
immediately after the Barrackpore Mutiny of 1824, for which insensitivity towards Hindu 
rituals had been perceived as the prime motivation.  Indeed the introduction of ‘Maulvies’ 
to the North Indian regiments was only effected after the Barrackpore Mutiny (a rebellion 
exclusive to Hindu regiments), and then only to balance the necessity of appointing 
‘Pandits’ to help assimilate the disorders attendant upon the British construction of a new 
Hindu ‘high-caste’ army.13   
To consider the charge of pre-1857 ‘mussulmanophobia’ more generally, it is 
necessary to recall that British interaction with Indo-Muslim socio-political movements 
in the first half of the century illustrates a markedly localising, circumscriptive tendency.  
The analyses by Hardy and Harlan Otto Pearson of the Bengal Fara’izi and the Tariqah-
i-Muhammadiya movements demonstrate that the British were never at any point 
seriously concerned with any supra-local implications, or the dangerous spread of 
seditious Muslim religious networks.  Even when, after the annexation of Punjab in 1849, 
the Tariqah turned their attentions against the British, colonial officials saw their 
interactions primarily in terms of border skirmishes (in contrast to the pandemic that 
‘Wahabism’ came to be seen as in post-1859 British accounts).14  Indeed, there is a 
suggestion that they had before allowed the Wahabi movement to flourish in order to 
undermine the Sikh state.15  The so-called ‘jihadists’ in Awadh on the eve of the ‘Mutiny’ 
provide another instructive instance of the extent to which local Muslim religious 
sensibilities were in fact regarded by the British as a useful tool in their larger political 
struggles.  Michael Fisher has pointed out the complicity of the Residency over this 
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movement in Awadh in 1856, which the British hoped might fuel their case for 
annexation (the short-lived movement eventually involved over four hundred combatants 
in open warfare with the state forces of Wajid Ali Shah).  And this was a movement that 
could even claim supra-local support by important North Indian Muslim figures, 
including the Begum of Bhopal.16 
 
Criminality and the rhetoric of fanaticism in 1857 
This is not to say that there was no discourse of Muslim ‘fanaticism’ present in British 
official writings in India before 1857.  But where this discourse arises – as, for instance, 
in the case of North Indian Muslim weaver communities, or indeed in the case of the 
Fara’izi, an agrarian movement of revolt – they closely follow the patterns of criminal 
‘outcasting’ during this period that have been documented by Gyanendra Pandey and 
Radhika Singha.  In other words, the discourse of ‘fanaticism’, like the discourse on 
‘Thuggee’, was aimed primarily at the construction of a lawful Indian society.17  
‘Fanaticism’ separated out troubling, circumscribed elements from the lawful body of 
Indian Muslims, facilitating the extension of colonial power into the public civil arena.  It 
displaced socio-economic grievances onto the transhistorical plane of communalism, 
drawing forth a response from the state purely in terms of ‘law and order’ and reinforcing 
its role as the descriptive arbiter of Indian society.18  The correspondence, demi-official 
and official accounts of Civil Service officers in the North-West Provinces and Awadh 
between 1857-59 strongly suggest that what had been a localising discourse of 
circumscription was effectively brought within the perception of lawful Indo-Muslim 
society.  For the first time in colonial discourse, Muslims across specific class, caste and 
regional considerations were liable to inscription with a potential criminality based on 
their religious allegiance.  As with the process of criminal ‘outcasting’, it set them apart 
from, and secured the ‘lawful’ re-branding of, the rest of Indian society.   
The correspondence of Alfred Lyall, deputy magistrate in Bulandshahr district in 
the North-West Provinces, vividly illustrates the effects of this process.  The first instance 
of the charge of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ occurs in a letter of 11th July 1857, in which Lyall 
asserts that ‘[the Mahometans] hate us with a fanatical hate that we never suspected to 
exist among them, and have everywhere been the leaders in the barbarous murdering and 
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mangling of the Christians’.19  Only two months earlier he had been assuring his mother 
that his sister-in-law, Mary Jane, would be safe in the Indian Hill district since there she 
would ‘have no dealings with the Hindoo’.20  At that point, for Lyall, ‘Hindoo’ and 
mutineer appear to have been interchangeable denominations that recurred alongside 
references to caste (especially ‘Goojur’) and sepoy outrages.  After 11th July these 
categories became progressively occluded.  Initially, references to caste insurrectionary 
activities became subsumed under the inflated category of ‘Hindoo’, which more often 
than not operated in tandem with, and indeed was incited by, the presence of the 
‘Mahometan’.  As early as 30th August, the ‘Hindoo’ appears to have been cleansed of 
any complicity with what was by then more exclusively a ‘Mahometan conspiracy’, 
prompting Lyall to confide to his mother: ‘I do not bear any spite against the Hindoos 
(excepting the sepoys) and I am always rather sorry to see them killed’.  Six months later, 
in March 1858, he was free to tell his brother-in-law, Mr Holland, that the rebels were 
‘Mahometans and sepoys’ only.  By 26th September the discursive realignment was 
complete, and he informed his mother categorically that even ‘Hindoo sepoys’ were 
‘guiltless’ of all atrocities.  The ‘Mahometan’ effectively had been exonerated, and 
separated from, the rest of Indian society.  Simultaneous with the proclamation of 
religious neutrality that ushered in the renewed British Indian state, the parametric logic 
of criminal ‘outcasting’ had testified in the mind of the young Civilian to the re-discovery 
of a lawful domestic Indian body. 
 
The self-identification of the Civil Service officer in 1857 
Lyall’s correspondence with home during the events of 1857-59 has been used by 
historians as a typical, if virulent, example of the ‘Mussulmanophobia’ that overtook 
British officials at that time.  The scrupulous analysis by Eric Stokes of the course of 
rebellion in his district argues that the mismatch between the absence of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’ in Bulandshahr and Lyall’s sincere belief in its guiding rationale may be 
taken as typical of the British experience in the regions adjacent to Delhi in 1857.  
Stokes’s conclusion, however, that this belief was purely the result of the ‘hankering after 
a simplistic explanation’ for the bewildering patchwork of mini-rebellions taking place, 
stops short of addressing its implication in the wider reconstitution of Indian society that 
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has been mapped above.21  It also, and crucially, misses the problem of self-identification 
that such an imaginative resolution entails.  For if the events of 1857 were to be seen as a 
Muslim war of ‘extermination’, then the British Civil Service officials at its receiving end 
were required to identify themselves primarily as its Christian victims. 
Christopher Bayly’s characterisation of the immediate pre-‘Mutiny’ British 
dispensation as a ‘covert confessional state’ places the charged question of religious 
identity at the heart of colonial governance.22  But the qualifier ‘covert’ belies the extent 
to which the disjunction between public and private self-identifications among British 
officials impacted upon their understanding and representation of Indian society.  This is 
nowhere more relevant than in the core administrative cadre of the Civil Service, many 
members of which (including Alfred Lyall) assented, in forms that range from the 
reluctant to the fanatical, to the ideology of secular neutrality that underpinned the mature 
systems of British rule in 1857 and justified the British presence as a necessarily foreign 
and neutral arbiter of indigenous religious rivalries.23  At the same time, more than any 
other branch of British rule in India, the Service was comprised of a remarkably 
homogenous community of officials drawn predominantly from an Anglican background, 
frequently with a close male relative serving in the Church (for instance, Lyall’s father 
was the Rector of Harbledown; his uncle the Dean of Canterbury).24  In other words, for 
most of the Civil Service, latent private assumptions of a church-state nexus significantly 
complicated – indeed, rendered paradoxical – the public repudiation of a religious 
imperative to governance in India.  It is here that ‘Mussulmanophobia’ obscures some of 
the crucial issues at stake in 1857.  Distinct from any particular religious imperative to 
the colonial project in India, the impact of this debilitating paradox of self-identification 
offers a compelling new route into the genesis and significance of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ in 
the mind of the Civil Service official in 1857. 
It is important to underscore that the ideology of colonial secular neutrality was 
not merely, or exclusively, a matter of pragmatic considerations.  Partha Chatterjee, 
among others, has convincingly argued that it was upon this ideological structure that the 
‘rule of colonial difference’ – that almost religious motif of nineteenth-century colonial 
discourse in India – was built.25  But until now, critical studies have failed to adequately 
account for the peculiar effects of the overnight collapse within the Civil Service of this 
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ideal of ‘difference’.  For in 1857, Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers believed 
themselves to be attacked not simply as functionaries of empire, but as Christians:  in 
other words, they believed themselves to have been pitched into what Pandey has defined 
as the discursive keystone of the late colonial state: the ‘narrative of the communal 
riot’.26  On one level, the language of religious retribution accessed by all quarters of 
Anglo-India must be seen as (predictably) rushing in to fill the ideological vacuum.27  
What has not been fully understood, however, is the more complex, ambivalent and 
debilitating role played in shaping this language in Civilian accounts by the simultaneous 
exposure of the structural paradox built into the ideological matrix of the ICS officer.  
The key question raised here concerns what happens to Civilian ideological subjectivity 
when it can no longer suppress its constitutive irrationality.  How can that subjectivity be 
recuperated?   
The intolerable pressures of such a realisation, and the peculiar idioms they give 
rise to, come to centre most immediately on the paradoxical category of ‘Christian 
Civilian’ in ICS accounts.  It is in the destabilising effects registered here that it is 
possible to see how Muslim ‘conspiracy’ and the paradox of Civilian self-representation 
are, from the outset, peculiarly reciprocal and disorienting discursive events. 
 
The semantics of ‘Christian’ victimhood 
Few considerations of Christianity intrude in Lyall’s pre-‘Mutiny’ letters, and where they 
do the young ICS recruit evinces a sceptical attitude not only to his own faith but also 
towards any possible future for the Anglican church in the subcontinent.  It is notable, 
then, that the point at which the Christian Civilian apparently first becomes a palpable 
presence in the correspondence is also the moment of the irruption of his perception of 
Muslim ‘conspiracy’.  In that letter of 11th July, Lyall writes: 
 
‘There is always something very laughable to me in the way these Hindoos will 
walk off with their enemy’s property the moment he is down.  Plunder always 
seems to be their chief object, to obtain which they will perform any villainy, 
whereas the Mahometans only seem to care about murdering their opponents, and 
are altogether far more bloody-minded.  Those last hate us with a fanatical hate that 
we never suspected to exist among them, and have everywhere been the leaders in 
the barbarous murdering and mangling of the Christians.’ 
 9 
 
The division of Hindu and Muslim between material and spiritual planes clearly serves to 
separate out and illuminate the particular transgression of the latter in the secularist terms 
of British Indian rule.  It also carries with it further temporal and spatial forms of 
separatism that will become increasingly important to the representation of Indian 
Muslims in the correspondence.  The Mahometan’s secret ‘hatred’ is marked by an 
unknown temporal origin (in comparison to the Hindu’s rather more immediate material 
obsession); and it arises beyond the confines of any particular space (‘everywhere’).  By 
24th November 1858, these features have been globalised:  Mahometans ‘are and always 
have been the deadly enemies of Christians’; and nothing short of a ‘regular crusade 
against every Mahometan in any country where Christians dwell’ will address the 
problem.  The inflation of these features constitutes the rhetorically apocalyptic endpoint 
of the process of criminal ‘outcasting’, setting the Indian Muslims down outside of the 
renewed British Indian state (where crusades are now unthinkable).   
It is important to bear in mind that the secret sharer in this process of outcasting is 
the conflicted location of the Civil Service officer himself.  Since, as Steven Goldsmith 
points out, the accession to apocalyptic rhetoric always marks the attempt to escape 
intolerable historical pressures, the similarly de-contextualising semantic effects of 
Lyall’s production here, of the figure of the Christian, are worth elaborating on as closely 
bound up with those pressures.28  For the relative clarity of Lyall’s use of the epithet ‘us’ 
(Civilian or British) in the letter of 11th July stands in contrast to the definition of ‘the 
Christians’:  which ‘Christians’ are being referred to here, native, European or British?  
In the normal course of Anglo-Indian classification, ‘the Christians’ would refer to 
natives only.  Yet here it suggests an expansion of the category through which the 
Civilian appears to be both smuggling in and simultaneously disavowing a self-referential 
designation.  In other words, the body of a native convert has been hesitantly interposed 
between Muslim ‘fanatic’ and Christian Civilian.  This lexical ambiguity is further 
heightened by the fact that in the immediate pre-‘Mutiny’ discourse ‘Christians’ had 
become a firm category, heavily policed and always conscientiously glossed.29  The 
presence of Lyall’s Mahometan thus obscures rather than (as might have been expected) 
sharpens the classification ‘Christian’, rendering it instead momentarily irreducible.  In 
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this sense, the rhetorical outcasting of the Indian Muslim appears to be linked to a novel 
confusion surrounding Lyall’s ideological identity. 
This might be taken as no more than a product of the haste of the moment of 
writing, were it not for the curious recurrence of this instability in the terms of self-
identification throughout the correspondence.  The most vivid instance comes in a letter 
of 30th August 1857 in which, describing the intensity of the feeling against the British, 
Lyall makes an uncharacteristic amendment (the correspondence as a whole is 
remarkably free of such mistakes), deleting ‘us’ from the phrase ‘us Christians’ and then, 
in reference to the opposing ‘fury’ it has brought forth from the British, he deletes 
another epithet (most probably ‘Christians’) and replaces it simply with ‘us’.  What this 
pattern of substitution and metonymy effect throughout is the lexical separation of 
Civilian and Christian.  By the time of the letter of 24th November 1858, the dispatch of 
the Indian Muslims to other countries and other times can be identified as aimed at the 
similar occlusion of the problematic historical contextualisation of the Civilian: 
 
‘the Mohamedans […] are a set of bloodthirsty fanatics who hate us to a man, and 
who will never be reconciled to us […] perhaps the recent outrages upon European 
consuls may in some degree open the eyes of the English.  The Mussulmans have 
always been the deadly enemies of Christians…’30 
 
The proliferation of nouns and pronouns in such a short space serves every purpose but 
clarity.  The first ‘us’ appears distinct from the third person opaque category of 
‘European consuls’, which is then opposed to ‘the English’; and all are finally translated 
to the context-free circumstance of ‘Christians’.  The precise affiliation of the Civil 
Service officer becomes lost in a thicket of possible identifications until, in apparent 
exasperation, Lyall reaches for other trans-temporal planes altogether.  The excising of 
the spatio-historical location of the Indian Muslim is thus matched by, and can be seen as 
partly responsive to, the ambivalent disassociation of the Civilian from his Christian 
identification within India. 
 The instability surrounding the self-identification of the Civilian in Lyall’s private 
letters home corresponds to a wider pattern that infects the official record of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’ in the North-West Provinces.  As with Lyall’s letters, it works towards 
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creating an irreducible category of ‘Christian’ in which the Civilian can no longer be 
located with any certainty.  This was nowhere more conspicuous than in the accounts by 
Civil Service officers of the events that took place in Agra in late 1857.  In the narrative 
by the magistrate at Muttra (Meerut district), Mark Thornhill, it is the Muslim ‘fanatic’ 
who both draws the British within the category of ‘Christian’ and simultaneously begins 
substantially to destabilise its definition.  This became apparent once Thornhill, having 
fled Muttra, at last reached the fort at Agra, when it was related that out of deference to 
the apparent prejudice of the mainly ‘Mahommedan police’ the ‘Christians’ of the 
‘volunteer corps’ had been disarmed by the misguided Civilian officials.31  At this point, 
the category seems to comprise ‘natives’ only, an interpretation reinforced when the 
narrator describes the retreat into Agra fort of the ‘English and Christians’.32  When a 
‘jehad’ is declared by the ‘Mahommedans’ of the city, however, the category begins to 
unravel.  Thornhill records that the ‘jehad’ was to be prosecuted against ‘Christians only’ 
(as opposed to, presumably, Hindus).  He then clarifies that ‘many of the victims were 
women, many were children; with one or two exceptions, all were natives’33.  Until now, 
not only might ‘Christians’ have already been assumed to refer to a purely native 
denomination, it appeared to have been one that did not even account for the ‘Eurasians’.  
This group had been earlier brought into the narrative alongside with, but distinct to, the 
‘Christians’.  Here they served as a counterweight to the delusive ‘trust’ placed in 
‘Mohammedans’ by the Agra Civilians, being one of the groups who had been disarmed 
(‘Christians and Eurasians’).34  Nevertheless, the single example that Thornhill cites to 
illustrate the massacre of the ‘Christians’ in Agra city turns out to be – though is here not 
specifically referred to as – a Eurasian (Major Jacobs).35  The category ‘Christian’, which 
had begun its life in the narrative alongside the potential ‘Mahommedan’ conspirator and 
had been invested with a meaning distinct from the ‘English’ and ‘Eurasians’, becomes at 
the outbreak of Muslim ‘conpiracy’ inclusive of both.  Thus the potential dangerous 
clarity that the ‘Mahommedan’ brings to the category, disclosing and enforcing its 
continual reinterpretation, ultimately works to exclude rather than define the Civilian; as 
in Lyall’s letters, the result is the effective uncoupling of the Civilian from his visible 
religious identification.  As if to underline this, the narrator later goes on to refer to the 
‘entire Christian population’ who had ‘taken refuge within the walls of the fort’ – 
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bringing the category, at the close of the murderous Muslim-led uprising, to an 
apparently inclusive, but now largely impenetrable and effectively destabilised, status.36  
What happened in Agra cantonment, civil station, and city during the ‘riots’ of 1857 has 
been established: a sectarian murder-spree.  By whom, it could not be more clear: the 
‘Mahommedan’ police force, inflaming, leading and directing the citizenry.  But against 
whom, is now, at an immediate linguistic level, all but opaque, for the only category 
offered, ‘Christians’, has lost most of its social, ethnic and political connotations. 
 Thornhill’s memoirs, published in London in 1884, would seem to be somewhat 
removed from the scene of action.  But even the most authoritative account of these 
events, compiled in 1859 by the Magistrate of Agra, A. L. M. Phillips, for the records of 
the Commissioner, Agra Division, is infected with precisely this kind of categorical 
confusion.  It occurs first with the mention of an official order that all the families of 
‘Christians’ return to the fort for safety.37  Since it simultaneously refers to the ‘native 
garrison’ to be withdrawn from the fort, it might seem that ‘Christians’ begin life in his 
narrative as a potentially exclusive European category.  But at the same time, a note of 
ambiguity is sounded by the observation that on receiving news of the open rebellion at 
‘Allygurh’, ‘great alarm was felt by the Christian population’.38  The description implies 
a British presence while at the same time disclosing, and interposing, a ‘native’ 
constituency.  That neither the inclusive nor exclusive definitions bespeak a commonly 
understood mode of Anglo-Indian discourse – and one therefore requiring no 
qualifications – is signalled by the reference to a separate order made later for ‘the 
admission of the Native Christians into the fort’.39  Nevertheless, it is this, by now 
indeterminate, category of ‘Christians’ that is set at the heart of Phillips’s account of the 
rebellion: 
 
‘From the time of the proclamation [of the reign of the king of Delhi] the property 
of Christians wherever they could be found in the city was plundered and 
themselves, both men, women and children ruthlessly murdered.’40 
 
Exactly whose property, the reader might ask, and indeed, who was murdered?  The 
narrative consequences of the descriptive deconstruction of this category impinge directly 
on even the statistical official record: when the magistrate comes to document ‘the 
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number of Christians who were […] murdered’, the precision with which he divides the 
figures into ‘men’, ‘women’ and ‘children’ stands in stark contrast to the lack of any 
other identifiable classifications (such as ‘English’, ‘European’, ‘native’ or ‘Eurasian’).  
It would seem, then, that the more Muslim ‘conspiracy’ is flushed out into the open, the 
further removed the Christian Civilian becomes from the scene of action.  Effectively, in 
Agra in 1857 he has disappeared from the official account. 
 
The ‘elsewhere’ of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ 
The destabilisation of the category of ‘Christian’, losing the Civilian within its shifting 
borders, points to a more thoroughgoing psychological process of occlusion in the official 
account of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ in 1857-59.  For what is under erasure here is not merely 
a pragmatic inconvenience (the Christian official) but the debilitating ideological paradox 
it contains:  the Christian official of a government predicated on secular difference.  This 
process of occlusion does not therefore simply obviate the problematic of laying claim to 
such an identity.  As Lyall’s overdetermined, visceral revisions make clear, it works to 
seclude its subject from the paradox that might otherwise stand revealed.  That paradox, 
as much as prejudice, must be seen as central to the perception of Muslim ‘conspiracy’, is 
made even further apparent by the fact that the spectre of ‘jehad’ or blind belief in 
Muslim treachery is much less frequently found in the accounts by those few among the 
service who openly espoused the evangelist case for government-sponsored conversion in 
India.41     
The consistency of the process of occlusion outlined above suggests that the 
perception and representation of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ functions in these narratives in 
accordance with the paradoxical reasoning essential to the preservation of all social 
ideologies.  Slavoj Zizek has posited that all state ideologies are invariably predicated on 
the impossible promise of a future transcendent achievement of the truth they embody, a 
utopian destination that is then inevitably held back by factors that seem to appear by 
chance or failure.42  As Gyanendra Pandey and Peter Van der Veer have demonstrated 
regarding the role of communalism in ideologies of the state in colonial and postcolonial 
India, these deleterious elements are in fact structural – necessary to bring the state into 
visibility but also to keep the illusion of the future fulfilment of the ideology in sight.43  
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Whether it is Hindu Nationalism or colonial secular neutrality, the fulfilment of that 
ideology can never be achieved but remains an immanent event preserved from 
recognising its own irrational foundations by its more or less exclusive focus on the very 
obstacle that appears to threaten its destruction.44 
Ensuring the survival of the ideology of British secular neutrality at its most acute 
moment of crisis, then, ironically entails cocooning the perception of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’, that which threatens to destroy it by bringing its Christian administrators 
within the deadly play of the very communal rivalries they are meant to arbitrate from 
without.  The fundamental irrational premise of an Anglican administration disconnecting 
itself from the state it administers effectively returns in the deadly guise of an invasive 
foreign presence marked by a religious imperative.  As the structural paradox 
indispensable to preserving the promise of the secular state’s survival in ICS accounts, 
that belief is always, as it were, protected from exposure.  The destabilisation of the 
category of ‘Christian’ is only one mode through which this preservation is effected (the 
semantic seclusion of the Civil Service officer from the ‘narrative of the communal riot’).  
Another and far more conspicuous aspect of that same occlusive logic is the 
disappearance of the scene of confrontation itself.  For the specific event of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’ in these narratives is itself commonly translated into an ‘elsewhere’, so that 
the one scene that almost never gains representation is the actual meeting of Muslim 
persecutor and Civil Service victim. 
Lyall’s letter of 11th July, inaugurating Muslim ‘conspiracy’ into this 
correspondence, is again symptomatic of this wider pattern of representation.  By taking 
one step back from the lexis of ‘Mussulmanophobia’, it is possible to see how the 
historiographical piecemeal treatment of Lyall’s letters has failed to pick up on the 
implications of their narrative strategies.  The scene into which he introduces his 
avaricious Hindu and murderous Muslim is in fact a staged encounter.  The letter as a 
whole details a punitive expedition against a local fort in which some insurgents who had 
been ‘plundering’ the countryside had taken refuge.  Lyall tells his father that on that day 
he personally had helped in the killing of about ‘130 men’; but ‘after taking the fort’ the 
British had ‘let loose a crowd of people who had been plundered and harried by these 
miscreants and they went to work with a will, stripping bare every house in the most 
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artistic manner’.  It is at this point that the comparative tableau of Hindu and Muslim is 
introduced.  In other words, and analogous to their employment on the day, Lyall deploys 
his ‘native’ figures in the narrative in an isolated schema of representation, from which 
the British have apparently been removed.  The senseless greed of the ‘Hindoo’ is in fact 
explained by the fact that the British have physically enabled the ‘plundering’ (which 
would seem to be no more than the retrieval of their own goods).  But the effect of this 
narrative strategy on the Muslim is even more remarkable, since the only massacre to 
have taken place is that perpetrated by the British.  The barbarous ‘mangler’ of Christian 
corpses is therefore himself only a metaphorical presence; the putative scene of Civilian-
Muslim interaction that comes to dominate Lyall’s description actually takes place in an 
‘elsewhere’, beyond the purview of the narrative.  This ‘elsewhere’ of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’ runs throughout the archive of 88 letters that constitutes Lyall’s 
correspondence during this period, both staging and holding apart the encounter of 
Christian Civilian and Muslim persecutor.  In the eyewitness account of its most 
infamous expositor, the actual event of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ never in fact takes place.45  
Across the official record of the phenomenon in the districts adjacent to Delhi, a 
bewildering variety of prophylactic strategies emerge to keep the Muslim ‘fanatic’ and 
his Christian Civilian victim in separate narrative spheres.  This can take relatively banal 
forms, such as that which occurs in the account published in The Delhi Gazette in 
December 1857 by J. F. Kitchen, Head Assistant to the Collector of Goregaon.  
Concluding a narrative that includes a testimonial by the author to the (Muslim) Nawab 
of Jhujjur for his protection of ‘Christians’ generally and for sheltering the Civilian’s 
family, and which sees ‘the green flag’ as playing only a minor and decidedly 
unconvincing part in his district, Kitchen makes the abrupt avowal that, though ‘the 
future is still hidden from us’, he trusts that the British will ‘defy all the assaults of infidel 
treachery and rebellion’.46  Through the common British synonym for Muslims (as 
opposed to the term ‘pagan’ applied by Anglo-Indians to Hindus in this period), Kitchen 
pledges himself to the larger corporate institution of ‘conspiracy’ and in the process 
retrospectively recasts his experience in its light.  Crucially, though, he does so once he is 
safely sequestered from its presence.  Muslim ‘conspiracy’ thus frames but does not 
directly mingle with the narrative.  It holds back and simultaneously promises, through its 
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surmounting, a future for the British in India.   
Filling out this picture of institutional incorporation, a useful comparison can be 
made with the account published in 1858 by William Edwards, Judge and Collector of 
Budaon in Rohilkhand.  Like that of Kitchen’s account, co-ordinated Muslim rebellious 
activity is not an apparent factor within the Edwards narrative.  Indeed, quite the 
opposite: his tendency is to repudiate its possibility.  For instance, he concludes that he is 
‘full satisfied’ that the Muslim ‘rural classes [who joined rebellion with the sepoys] could 
not have been acted upon by any cry of their religion in danger’.47  Despite disquieting 
rumours during ‘Ede’, he insists that the ‘Mahommedans’ of Burdaon were easily 
manipulated by him, ‘knowing as I did that a bitter animosity existed between several of 
them’.48  And when the suggestion of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ itself is broached to him, 
Edwards contextualises it as potentially misleading information.49  Such judicious 
discriminations point up the lethal uncertainty that otherwise organises and drives his 
narrative, rarely allowing him to fathom the motives and intentions of most of his native 
informants.  The notable exceptions to this rule are often where individual Muslims 
figure in the narrative, frequently as faithful guides, ‘friends’, and protectors.50  
Nevertheless, when his account was incorporated into the demi-official conspectus of 
administrative records published in Calcutta in 1859, the editor N. A. Chick summarised 
Edwards’ experience with the comment that ‘everywhere [Edwards] found the 
Mohammedans more hostile to the British than the Hindoos’.51  Chick’s extraordinary 
editorial intervention effectively acts in the manner of Kitchen’s final declaration: it 
recasts the Civilian’s experience from the protected margins beyond the narrative.  In 
doing so, it directs the reader towards the undisclosed ‘elsewhere’ of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’, while keeping its otherwise ignorant Civilian victim safe from 
contamination. 
 
The limits of restoring Civilian subjectivity 
The division of the narratives of Lyall, Kitchen and Chick/Edwards into contiguous but 
apparently separated spheres acts as more than a form of containment.  It imparts to them 
a unity of self-perception that is otherwise unavailable.  In effect, it enables an account 
characterised by indecision, obscured vision and fallibility to achieve the omniscience of 
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a third person narrative; and in so doing it translates the object of these accounts – the 
bewildered Civilian – into their subject, the restored author of his own story.  The 
‘elsewhere’ of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ in this way represents a space of agency for the 
Civilian, through which the fractures of self-identification are ostensibly healed.  He is no 
longer a participant in the ‘narrative of the communal riot’, but once again its neutral, 
though outraged, reporter. 
Mark Thornhill’s later memoir illustrates the degree to which this kind of almost 
schizophrenic resolution, so jarring in immediate accounts such as those by 
Chick/Edwards and Kitchen, can come in time to seem naturalised as a narrative strategy.  
His account is divided equally into two isometric halves.  The first half details what 
amounts to an eyewitness report, comparable in its tropes of doubt and limited vision to 
those of Chick/Edwards and Kitchen before the irruption of ‘conspiracy’.  It recounts his 
flight to Agra, in which the few signs of Muslim co-ordinated activity that he documents 
are not related to any broader explanation for the rebellion.  As with Edwards, the author 
describes numerous incidents of the loyalty of individual Muslims, and especially that of 
his faithful guide, Dilawar Khan.  They appear to act as companions and even saviours 
throughout these episodes.52  Once Thornhill reaches and joins the besieged garrison in 
Agra fort, the process of recasting that experience begins.  The physical re-incorporation 
into the Anglo-Indian community is accompanied now by the narrative attempt to re-
interpret and incorporate the experiences of the first half of his own story into the larger 
‘Mutiny’ narrative of Muslim ‘conspiracy’.  It is as if the physical circumscription of his 
internment in Agra fort incites a renewed and unfettered narrative vision, one that allows 
him to transcend time and space.  The ‘elsewhere’ of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ here 
corresponds directly to the extra-narrative region from which this vision derives: that is, 
Thornhill’s partial singular voice gives way to the polyphonic unity of the Civilian 
‘Mutiny’ archive on Muslim ‘conspiracy’, drawing on published sources (some of them 
from Chick’s compendium) and reports that he could only have accessed long after his 
flight and using them to bring the two halves of his narrative into alignment.  The actions 
of the fanatical Muslim police, in events that take place before his arrival and continue 
beyond the fort walls and his immediate narrative competence, provide the compass by 
which he can retrace and gain authorship over his own rudderless journey.  So hegemonic 
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is this renewed vision that Thornhill the protagonist literally becomes a character 
operating under the logic of pathetic irony controlled by his other narrating self.  The 
process climaxes in the recapitulation of a hitherto mysterious dash from the house of the 
‘Seths’ who had been protecting him, which is now explained through the (belated) 
revelation of a ‘plot’ by the Seths’ ‘Mohammedan guards’ to ‘murder us all’.  This, the 
omniscient narrator spells out from the security of his confinement in Agra, was the 
moment of ‘our greatest peril’.53  What his protagonist self did not know, it would seem, 
could not harm him; what the Christian Civilian could not see, his neutral observer can 
now safely disclose. 
This distanced, and almost novelistic, narrative should not be invested with an 
ability to control not simply a profound crisis in Civilian self-presentation, but the 
question of ideological disempowerment that structured it.  In his recapitulation of the 
events of his flight a strain of uncanny, and therefore potentially disempowering, imagery 
enters Thornhill’s narrative that increasingly evokes this subterranean faultline of identity 
and power, and its disturbing imbrication with the spectre of Muslim ‘conspiracy’.  By 
‘uncanny’, it should be understood here in Freud’s usage of the term, as the familiar 
estranged in a manner that always ‘leads back to what is known’.54  This imagery is 
therefore one of confused transposition where the British can actually be transformed 
into, or be rendered as the helpless affects of, the very Muslim figures they otherwise 
seek to circumscribe and isolate.  In its minor register in the narrative, the insurgent 
Muslim police force is inscribed with qualities such as unity of purpose that had in the 
first half of the narrative been explicitly introduced as precisely the British virtues that 
originally carved the British Indian empire out of a divided Hindu society.55  While at the 
same time, the author describes how, faced with a Muslim leadership now unifying the 
cross-communal body of sepoys and citizenry, the besieged British garrison is seen to 
disintegrate into bickering factions.56  A more intense image reveals an encounter with 
the escaped convicts from the Agra jail as the direct result of the treacherous actions of a 
‘Mohammedan official’.57  Thornhill comes across these ex-convicts as ‘phantoms from 
another world’ who mirror the passing British refugees, but also render them ‘invisible’ 
by their refusal to take note of (or even look at) their former masters as they rattle their 
broken British chains – an uncanny image of power upturned, further intensified by the 
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description of British bungalows in the distance as ‘cages of fire’.58 
Thornhill’s ‘phantoms from another world’ itself gains an unnerving echo in a 
scene that is replicated in different guises throughout the 1857 official archive and that 
touches most directly on the British self-representation involved in Muslim ‘conspiracy’.  
The magistrate describes how, overhearing the conversation of two of his peons shortly 
before the ‘Mutiny’, he becomes suddenly aware of the depth of their secret attachment 
to the ‘traditions’ of the Mughal court.  Prefacing the narrative of rebellion that follows, 
he writes of this conversation: ‘There was something weird in the Mogul Empire thus 
starting into a sort of phantom life after the slumber of a hundred years’.59  In the 
besieged fort at Agra this Mughal ‘phantom’ is again re-vivified, in terms that today 
appear comic but at the time had clearly made an impression on their author.  Thornhill 
describes how the Emperor Akbar was said to irrupt from the vaults of the fort and 
confront a sepoy stationed there.  When he is told that the building is now a ‘Company 
Fort’, his response is to scream out: ‘It is false!  The house is mine! Mine!! Mine!!!’60  
Clearly symbolising the dispossession of the British Indian state, the ‘phantom’ of 
Mughal rule returns as an uncanny manifestation of sectarianism as well, since it 
coincides in the narrative with, and appears to simulate, the murderous activities of the 
Muslim Civil Service officials and police just beyond the walls of the fort.  The Mughal 
Emperor, and through him the dispossessed British Indian state, is thus reborn into the 
narrative under the sign of Muslim ‘conspiracy’.  Far from effectively separating Civilian 
and sectarian, Thornhill has compressed them into a thoroughly disorienting vision of the 
state simultaneously under attack from without and within. 
 
Conclusion 
This last image returns us to the confused ceremony of ‘desacralisation’ in the Red Fort 
in 1857, in which the repossession of the British Indian state is marked in the rituals of 
the very sectarianism it claimed to forestall.  Paradox, it has been argued, is not incidental 
to this scene, it is structural to the renewed understanding of ICS ideological subjectivity 
in India, significantly shaping the peculiar features and appeal of the perception of 
Muslim ‘conspiracy’ in the mind of the British Civil Service officer in 1857.  The 
recurrence in Civilian accounts of elements of categorical instability and confusion, 
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narrative strategies that work consistently to hold apart the protagonists and displace the 
scene of encounter, and the disorienting irruption of uncanny imagery that transposes 
them, indicate that the contours of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ were partly determined by a 
crisis over official self-identification.  That crisis centred on the sudden exposure in 1857 
of a crucial aspect of the state ideology, the founding paradox of their claims to 
administrate a system predicated on the occlusion of their own religious identity.  For 
Civilians, that paradox was compounded by the latent assumptions of a church-state 
nexus that their Anglican background still carried.  What the language of Muslim 
‘conspiracy’ in part constituted, then, was an ambivalent, indeed agonising, crucible for 
the urgent question of the representation and role of paramountcy in India.  The scenes of 
exhumation and exorcism surrounding the dispossessed Mughal in the Agra and Red 
Forts are therefore paradigmatic of the larger economy of representation involved in 
Muslim ‘conspiracy’.  For once the impulse towards exorcism is acted upon, the 
prophylactic strategies are overcome and the conspiracy is actually summoned up, what 
invariably arrives to confront their authors is never the statement of discursive 
empowerment that was intended.  Instead, the British participants of Muslim ‘conspiracy’ 
are time and again presented with disturbing spectacles of reversal and self-dispossession, 
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